AS201701 im Spoofer Report DENOG Juli 2018


Da seid ihr auf einer unrühmlichen Liste gelandet. Darf man fragen was da los war?

In response to feedback from operational security communities,
CAIDA’s source address validation measurement project
( is automatically generating monthly
reports of ASes originating prefixes in BGP for systems from which
we received packets with a spoofed source address.
We are publishing these reports to network and security operations
lists in order to ensure this information reaches operational
contacts in these ASes.

This report summarises tests conducted within deu.

Inferred improvements during Jul 2018:
ASN Name Fixed-By
16202 PRIMACOM 2018-07-17

Further information for the inferred remediation is available at:
Evidence of Remediation

Source Address Validation issues inferred during Jul 2018:
ASN Name First-Spoofed Last-Spoofed
30823 COMBAHTON 2016-02-16 2018-07-11
12222 AKAMAI 2018-02-14 2018-07-06
29562 KabelBW-ASN 2018-06-12 2018-07-03
61157 PLUSSERVER-ASN1 2018-06-14 2018-07-27
6805 TDDE-ASN1 2018-07-10 2018-07-23
201701 FFRL 2018-07-27 2018-07-27

Further information for these tests where we received spoofed
packets is available at:


Der Filter für ungültige Pakete von den Communities war an 2 Standorten nicht mehr aktiv.
Wir haben ihn wieder aktiviert und verschwinden hoffentlich bald von der Liste.


Inferred improvements during Sep 2018:

ASN Name Fixed-By
201701 FFRL 2018-09-08

Danke auch an @Lars für den fix :slight_smile: